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Introduce FundingTransactionReadyForSignatures
event
#3889
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👋 Thanks for assigning @jkczyz as a reviewer! |
let witnesses: Vec<_> = transaction | ||
.input | ||
.into_iter() | ||
.filter_map(|input| if input.witness.is_empty() { None } else { Some(input.witness) }) | ||
.collect(); |
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Don't have a strong opinion here, but seems we can avoid this by passing the Transaction
through and only collecting witnesses when we are ready to construct TxSignatures
.
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Cool, yeah will look at changing this after fixups.
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Looks good!
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🔔 2nd Reminder Hey @wpaulino! This PR has been waiting for your review. |
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🔔 3rd Reminder Hey @wpaulino! This PR has been waiting for your review. |
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Not sure if there was a problem rebasing, but some comments that had been marked resolved weren't fixed.
Yeah, they got lost on a rebase and somehow lost the commit. Rebased to get the one CI fix in. Fixing. |
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🔔 4th Reminder Hey @wpaulino! This PR has been waiting for your review. |
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🔔 5th Reminder Hey @wpaulino! This PR has been waiting for your review. |
🔔 6th Reminder Hey @wpaulino! This PR has been waiting for your review. |
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
Outdated
fn verify_interactive_tx_signatures(&mut self, _witnesses: &Vec<Witness>) { | ||
if let Some(ref mut _signing_session) = self.interactive_tx_signing_session { | ||
// Check that sighash_all was used: | ||
// TODO(dual_funding): Check sig for sighash |
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Any reason this isn't done yet?
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Oh yeah we're actually unable to do this reliably, especially if inputs were spend P2WSH. The public comments warn the client to ensure it is SIGHASH_ALL
(or SIGHASH_DEFAULT/SIGHASH_ALL) if spending a P2TR UTXO.
These TODOs need to be removed.
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We should be able to use ScriptBuf::instructions
to identify all pushes that match a signature length, parse those that match, and make sure they come with SIGHASH_ALL
.
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I'm worried we assume something is a sig just based on length when it's not. I mean it's probably a sig, but we'd then actually need to check if there is a corresponding checksig in the script.
If it wasn't a sig then we'd always treat that as invalid if it happens to have the same length and something that looks like a sighash_all byte (or the case no explicit sighash as in p2tr sighash_default).
It's probably unlikely but I haven't considered how "probably".
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For ECDSA sigs we can be a bit more sure since they have to parse as DER-encoded. P2WSH and P2TR-script-spend always reveal the witness script so we can certainly check for corresponding OP_CHECKSIG
s there. P2WPKH and P2TR-key-spend have a specific index within the witness that corresponds to the signature.
If we don't check this for holder witnesses, then we're susceptible to malleability attacks.
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We checked that all prev outputs are "standard" during tx construction, so if a witness is not one of the recognised witnesses shall we just ignore and not error? (considering it'll fail anyway). I'd say we should only care about checking for sighash types for witnesses corresponding to "standard" scriptpubkeys.
We shouldn't ever get to this point if that were the case, we should return an error when the inputs are provided.
The function name should probably include "sighash_type" to make it clear that's all we check.
We could also consider using the validation
feature on the bitcoin
crate to actually verify witnesses.
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We shouldn't ever get to this point if that were the case, we should return an error when the inputs are provided.
Yip, exactly.
We could also consider using the validation feature on the bitcoin crate to actually verify witnesses.
Yeah we could and since we’re only verifying the ones provided by the client, we don’t add much to the “DoS budget” from an “untrusted” peer.
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We could also consider using the validation feature on the bitcoin crate to actually verify witnesses.
I'm not super excited to start depending on this in non-test. Its been removed from Bitcoin Core so is slowly getting more and more outdated and I don't think anyone else uses it aside from us anyway. If we checked the list of scripts is in one of several standard formats, we can (and should, IMO) just use that knowledge to check things.
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For P2TR script path spend we’d be uncertain if it was a signature or just random 64 bytes (65 with explicit sighash).
The solution to also look for corresponding op_checksigs becomes tricky since we’d also need to consider that for op_checksigadd where there is a threshold.
It could be done but you’d at least need to do some very basic script validation to see if the supposed signatures are consumed by checksig opcodes and then only verify the sighash type of those. Conditional branching in script further complicates that (even though people should probably use a different leaf script in that case).
It feels like we’d run into the problem of writing our own validation just to check this.
I can’t imagine we’d get many false positives if we assumed 64/65 byte things are signatures. It just feels wrong.
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Discussed this in the meeting. Will push another update tomorrow re-adding scriptpubkeys to NegotiatedTxInput
and fully verifying key-spends, but not P2WSH or P2TR script-path (we'll make it very clear the client is on their own as they should know what they're doing and we'll describe the consequences). We will check all signatures in witnesses use sighash_all as well.
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The `FundingTransactionReadyForSignatures` event requests witnesses from the client for their contributed inputs to an interactively constructed transaction. The client calls `ChannelManager::funding_transaction_signed` to provide the witnesses to LDK.
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…hecks In a following commit, We'll use the contained scriptPubKeys to validate P2WPKH and P2TR key path spends and to assist in checking that signatures in provided holder witnesses use SIGHASH_ALL to prevent funds being frozen or held ransom.
LDK checks the following: * Each input spends an output that is one of P2WPKH, P2WSH, or P2TR. These were already checked by LDK when the inputs to be contributed were provided. * All signatures use the `SIGHASH_ALL` sighash type. * P2WPKH and P2TR key path spends are valid (verifies signatures) NOTE: * When checking P2WSH spends, LDK tries to decode 70-72 byte witness elements as ECDSA signatures with a sighash flag. If the internal DER-decoding fails, then LDK just assumes it wasn't a signature and carries with checks. If the element can be decoded as an ECDSA signature, the the sighash flag must be `SIGHASH_ALL`. * When checking P2TR script-path spends, LDK assumes all elements of exactly 65 bytes with the last byte matching any valid sighash flag byte are schnorr signatures and checks that the sighash type is `SIGHASH_ALL`. If the last byte is not any valid sighash flag, the element is assumed not to be a signature and is ignored. Elements of 64 bytes are not checked because if they were schnorr signatures then they would implicitly be `SIGHASH_DEFAULT` which is an alias of `SIGHASH_ALL`.
We directly get the holder `TxSignatures` when necessary.
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@@ -7605,6 +7586,188 @@ where | |||
} | |||
} | |||
|
|||
fn verify_interactive_tx_signatures( |
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Needs some clean up and tests but pushed it for some review.
// drop any V2-established/spliced channels which have not yet exchanged the initial `commitment_signed`. | ||
// We only exhange the initial `commitment_signed` after the client calls | ||
// `ChannelManager::funding_transaction_signed` and ALWAYS before we send a `tx_signatures` | ||
// We never write out FundingTransactionReadyForSigning events as they will be regenerated necessary. |
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when necessary*
@@ -1786,7 +1786,7 @@ where | |||
#[rustfmt::skip] | |||
pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>( | |||
&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L | |||
) -> Result<(Option<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> | |||
) -> Result<(Option<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> |
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Maybe it's time we make this an enum?
@@ -1840,15 +1840,15 @@ where | |||
let res = if has_negotiated_pending_splice && !session_received_commitment_signed { | |||
funded_channel | |||
.splice_initial_commitment_signed(msg, logger) | |||
.map(|monitor_update_opt| (None, monitor_update_opt)) | |||
.map(|monitor_update_opt| (None, monitor_update_opt, None)) |
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We will also need to return the unsigned transaction here for splices.
if let Some(unsigned_transaction) = funding_tx_opt { | ||
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(); | ||
pending_events.push_back(( | ||
Event::FundingTransactionReadyForSigning { |
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I think we'll also need to generate this on reestablish when we have already received commitment_signed
but not tx_signatures
.
@@ -1529,7 +1538,13 @@ impl InteractiveTxInput { | |||
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fn into_negotiated_input(self) -> NegotiatedTxInput { | |||
let weight = self.input.estimate_input_weight(); | |||
NegotiatedTxInput { serial_id: self.serial_id, txin: self.input.into_tx_in(), weight } | |||
let prev_output = self.input.prev_output().clone(); |
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Not a huge deal but seems like we could easily avoid the clone here?
let all_prevouts = sighash::Prevouts::All(&prev_outputs[..]); | ||
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let mut cache = SighashCache::new(&built_tx); | ||
let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only(); |
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We should just pass through the existing secp context in ChannelContext
} | ||
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// P2TR key path spend witness includes signature and optional annex | ||
if script_pubkey.is_p2tr() && witness.len() <= 2 { |
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We should probably check that the second element is an annex as it should start with 0x50
, but I think transactions with one aren't relayed/mined by default with Bitcoin Core yet.
fn verify_interactive_tx_signatures( | ||
&mut self, witnesses: &Vec<Witness>, | ||
) -> Result<(), APIError> { | ||
if let Some(session) = &self.interactive_tx_signing_session { |
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Needs an error when None
|| self | ||
.pending_splice | ||
.as_ref() | ||
.and_then(|pending_splice| Some(pending_splice.funding.is_some())) | ||
.unwrap_or(false) && self | ||
.context | ||
.channel_state | ||
.is_monitor_update_in_progress(); |
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Could be worth having a helper for this
Cherry-picked from #3735 as it is relevant to splicing and will unblock testing after #3736 lands.
The
FundingTransactionReadyForSignatures
event requests witnesses from the client for their contributed inputs to an interactively constructed transaction.The client calls
ChannelManager::funding_transaction_signed
to provide the witnesses to LDK.